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The National Guard Citizen-Soldier

The Linkage
between Responsible
National Security
Policy and the
Will of the People

Mark P. Meyer
Colonel, ANG

Air War College
Maxwell Paper No.6

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
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National Security Policy
and the
Will of the People**

MARK P. MEYER
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MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

November 1996

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This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for public release.

Foreword

It is my distinct pleasure to sign the foreword to the first Air War College paper to win the General Ronald R. Fogleman Award. This award is given by the National Guard Association of the United States for the paper that best demonstrates the relationship between the full-time, active duty military and the Guard.


As we move into the next century we must appreciate the fact that the United States is a militia nation, and the large standing military of the last 50 years is an aberration. The significance of the militia nation culture cannot be underestimated, and it must be ingrained into the force designers and force maintainers of the future as tomorrow's Air Force continues to play an important role in supporting our national security policy.

In "The National Guard Citizen-Soldier," Col Mark P. Meyer provides an excellent examination of the linkage between responsible national security policy and the will of the people. He argues that for our democratic government to act responsibly, it is imperative that national policy reflects the will of the people. It is especially important when the policy involves the use of the armed forces. In the United States, the National Guard and its citizen-soldiers are an essential part of the linkage. Without the existence and use of the National Guard, the nation treads dangerously toward inconsistency between the will of the people and national security policy.

Colonel Meyer builds his case on the assumption that National Guardsmen contribute to the legitimacy of the military's role as protector of the country. Citizen-soldiers provide a unifying bond between liberal democratic society and the authoritarian hierarchy of the armed forces. Nevertheless, to make

the citizen-soldier role work, employers, coworkers, and indeed families must all be supportive. Laws have been necessary to protect guardmen's reemployment rights. Born in the Nixon administration, the total force policy has finally achieved a very effective blending of Guard, Reserve, and active duty elements. American performance in the Gulf War proved it.

An understanding of the principles addressed by Colonel Meyer in this paper will serve the reader well and will assure that the United States future armed forces will continue to have the support of the people of our great nation.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Ron Fogleman', with a stylized, looping initial 'R' and a horizontal line extending to the right.

RONALD R. FOGLEMAN
General, USAF
Chief of Staff, Air Force

About the Author

Col Mark P. Meyer is a graduate of the US Air Force Academy, class of 1972. After six years on active duty as an operational fighter pilot, he spent 18 years as a member of the Colorado Air National Guard. He held positions as fighter squadron commander, squadron operations officer, and wing chief of Standardization and Evaluation. He completed the National Security Management Course, National Defense University, in 1989. Colonel Meyer is a graduate of the Air War College, class of 1996.

The National Guard Citizen-Soldier

The Linkage between Responsible National Security Policy and the Will of the People

In a speech one year before his election to the presidency, Abraham Lincoln stated, "Public opinion is everything. With it nothing can fail. Without it nothing can succeed."¹ For the next five years he struggled to honor those prophetic words as he held the national consensus through the bloodiest war in US history.

Lincoln recognized that war in a democratic nation requires maintaining the "will of the people" through victory or the cause could be lost off the battlefield as well as on it. His efforts were focused on that principle as he pursued the national objectives of the war while keeping the majority support for the cause. His success in that endeavor is proven by his successful reelection in 1864.

The Lincoln administration, with the advice of Lt Gen Winfield Scott, made the decision to keep the standing Army of the United States intact in their posts on the Western frontier and rely on the states for recruitment of a volunteer citizen army. The small Regular Army could not be moved from its western posts quickly and was inadequate for the needs of the Union in 1861. The initial call for volunteers raised an army of 91,816 and within four months of the firing on Fort Sumter, the Union army had increased its original strength 27 times. It was the citizen army that first saved Washington early in the fighting of the Civil War.² In short, the Union successfully fought the war with an army of citizen-soldiers, and with the involvement of those volunteers, maintained the national consensus long enough to fight to victory.

For a democratic government to act responsibly, it is imperative that there be a consistency between national policy and the will of the people. It is especially important when the policy involves the use of armed forces. It is the contention of this paper that the National Guard and its citizen-soldiers are an essential part of the consistency linkage, and that without the existence or use of the National Guard, the nation treads dangerously toward

inconsistency between national security policy and the will of the people.

In *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, the Clinton administration wrote, "The United States cannot long sustain a fight without the support of the public. This is true for humanitarian and other nontraditional interventions, as well as war."³ The National Guard, as an integral part of the nation's military, possesses a unique ability to influence the actions of the elected representatives of government to reflect the will of the people.

There are limitations in the ability of the active military to hold to this commitment of the national security strategy. Col Charles E. Heller of the US Army War College wrote,

Revert to a primarily [active component] contingency force for about 30 to 60 days without substantial [reserve component] augmentation and you run the risk that the "will of the people" might never solidify around what some might perceive as the administration's "military adventurism" using a "mercenary" (All-Volunteer) Regular force. Involving the [reserves] early in any operation, including a contingency, is absolutely essential for the well-being of the Army and its fragile relationship with "the people."⁴

This paper reviews the tradition of citizen-soldiers of the United States and identifies their value in providing a link between the policymakers of the nation and the will of the citizens in national security policy. It uses the Vietnam War as an example of the failure of this essential link when the National Guard was not used, and uses the Persian Gulf War, fought under the United States' total force policy, as a positive example.

Beyond the contribution that the National Guard makes in providing combat-ready forces, the Guard first maintains consistency with the long tradition in the US of a citizen army. Second, the National Guard provides the president and Congress a unique means of maintaining the will of the people while pursuing national objectives.

Original Intent: Deny Tyranny of Central Government

After the successful fight for independence, the newly formed United States struggled to establish a government that matched its heritage and traditions, yet overcame the

ills the colonies had suffered under Great Britain's colonial dominance. Fears of further suppression by a tyrannical power countered arguments for a strong central government. In finding a solution, the framers of the Constitution showed their ability to balance political idealism and the more realistic concern for how men in power might actually behave. They built on their two centuries of colonial experience and at every level of government formed multiple institutions that provided checks and a balance of power. The result was a form of government that guaranteed the rights of individuals and states to protect and govern themselves and a federal government that provided for the common defense.⁵ The military system the framers created divided power between the federal government and the states and further divided military power at the federal level between the president and Congress.

Just before the Revolutionary War, military practice in the colonies could be accurately characterized by intense localism, lack of cooperation, and endemic resistance to centralized control.⁶ All of the English North American colonies, with the exception of Pennsylvania, established the principle of universal obligation and citizen-based defense.⁷ Virtually all colonies required universal military training and service for eligible men, requiring the militiamen to arm and equip themselves.⁸ Colonial defense served the needs of the local community, and its effectiveness was totally dependent on the nature and leadership of the individual communities.

Critics of the National Guard have often quoted George Washington from his September 1776 letter of warning to the Congress that "to place any dependence upon militia, is, assuredly, resting upon a broken staff."⁹ However, according to his *Sentiments on a Peace Establishment* written in May 1783, he relied on the militia, a "well-regulated militia," such as he had in the Continental army at the close of the Revolution. He contemplated a body of young men from the community who were properly led and periodically trained under uniform supervision.¹⁰

The structure of the military in the new nation reflected the founders' fundamental judgment about the foundation of the state. Thomas Jefferson wrote,

The Greeks by their laws, and the Romans by the spirit of their people, took care to put into the hands of their rulers no such engine of oppression as a standing army. Their system was to make every man a soldier, and oblige him to repair to the standard of his country whenever that was reared. This made them invincible; and the same remedy will make us so.¹¹

The drafters of the Constitution did not have to look back more than a few years to cite an example of the danger of large standing armies. In 1783, the Continental army had felt powerful after their defeat of the British. Feeling betrayed by Congress over forsaken promises on wages and pensions, officers of the army conspired to overthrow Congress. Only after being dissuaded by George Washington did they abandon their plans for a coup. The attempted coup reinforced the general belief held in America that a strong standing army, by its very nature, is a threat to liberty.¹²

The majority of the convention drafting the Constitution accepted the notion that long-standing armed forces invariably become a tool of tyranny.¹³ Evidence of this fact is that the Continental army was allowed by Congress to disband to all but 80 men after the Revolution.¹⁴ Sam Huntington explained this American ideology of minimizing force structure in peacetime in *The Soldier and the State*. Large military forces, he contends, are a threat to liberty, economic prosperity, democracy, and peace.¹⁵

The alternative, a citizen-based defense, was not without critics. The criticism started in the colonial and revolutionary periods with accusations of lack of national loyalty, improper leadership, and inadequate training. That controversy has reappeared over the entire history of the citizen-soldier. The operational effectiveness of the volunteer tradition in the United States remains in contention today.

It may not be the operational history, however, that is as important as the political, social, and institutional contribution of the volunteer tradition in American history.¹⁶ The militia dominated the early military tradition because the American citizens feared the monarchy and any strong central government. The nation in its infancy was more concerned about tyranny from within than external defense. States felt a strong need for control over their own defense, and individuals wanted to maintain their own

arms against any impingement on their rights as citizens. The citizen-soldier tradition is embedded in American military history.

Constitutional Guarantees and the Early Days

It is in the foundation of the Constitution that all legitimate authority derives from the people. Therefore, a corollary principle of the Constitution is civilian control of the military.¹⁷

In addition to civilian control, the framers purposely crafted a compromise between military effectiveness and political control. They designed deliberate inefficiencies as part of the protection of society from the power and authority of the military. They put their trust in balance, the diffusion of power, and shared responsibility.¹⁸ Military authorization was divided between the militia under state control and the Army and Navy under federal control.

The drafters of the Constitution had argued over the status of the militia, but the issue was seldom in doubt. The Federalists won a victory when Article I, Section 8 gave the Congress the power "to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." The Constitution also charged Congress with organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia.¹⁹ The president, in Article II, Section 2, was named commander in chief of the Army, Navy, and the state militias (when the militias are called into the service of the United States).²⁰

The anti-Federalists wanted to secure the rights of the states to maintain military forces. When the issue of the cost of standing forces was joined with the dangers of centralized political control, the Federalists conceded that the nation's land force would depend upon the militia for its major source of operational units. The Second Amendment to the Constitution was adopted reflecting civilian control and decentralized power: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." The future debate of 150 years would revolve around who

would control the militia, the states or the federal government.²¹

The first test of the federal army/state militias compromise came with the War of 1812. President James Madison secured congressional approval of a wartime army of 166,000 men to be composed primarily of militiamen.²² The War of 1812 can hardly be considered a pure military success, but of ultimate significance is that an army raised out of the militia system achieved the objectives of the war.

Compulsory militia service of the early days of the republic disappeared by the Civil War. After the war, volunteer companies kept alive the concept of the citizen-soldier long enough to lay the foundations of the modern National Guard.

As the nation has grown, the citizen-soldier has changed in character, role, and capability, but the concept remains rooted deep in US tradition. Professionalization and industrialization of war have challenged the institution of the National Guard, but they have certainly not killed it. In 1944, John McAuley Palmer, brought out of retirement by Chief of Staff Gen George C. Marshall, drafted a document concerning postwar force structure. It stated that American wars have, "in the main," been fought using citizen-soldiers, and that including or integrating the citizen-soldiers in peace "is merely a proposal for perfecting a traditional national institution to meet modern requirements which no longer permit extemporization after the outbreak of war."²³

The National Guard has survived in concept even as the institution has evolved. Most Americans are no longer fearful of a tyrannical central government ruling under the power of a standing army, but the citizen-soldier remains. States remain jealous of their rights to maintain a local militia and have made sound use of them throughout US history. The militias' heritage is strong and their purpose is defined. It remains accepted in our culture that the average citizen be available to defend both the community during local emergencies and the nation at times of war. As in other aspects of America's public life, the Constitution has proven both durable and elastic in providing the necessary forces for America's defense.²⁴

Citizen-Soldier: The Civil-Military Bridge

According to Brig Gen Thomas J. Matthews, commanding general of the US Army 353d Civil Affairs Command, "The great thing about a democracy is that it allows ordinary people to enjoy extraordinary success and do extraordinary things."²⁵ Our society relies on common citizens to accept responsibility for every aspect of public administration and maintenance. Ordinary citizens rise to every position of political leadership including the presidency. Every individual also has the right to compete for positions in business or public service. One of those opportunities, by right and choice, is participation in the military service.

Americans not only have an opportunity but an obligation to participate in the republican form of government. It is only in that way that the government maintains legitimacy, since legitimacy requires that national policy reflect the will of the people. A lack of understanding between civil leadership and the people results in unpopular national policy, which leads to disaster in a democracy.

Likewise, a separation between national military policy and the concerns of the citizenry under the protection of the military invites the potential for the tyranny that Thomas Jefferson warned about. Legitimacy of military policy is similarly at stake and needs to be analyzed. The legitimacy of the armed forces is guaranteed as long as the military meets three conditions.

1. The function of the military coincides sufficiently with the goals defined by the political community.
2. The military subculture coincides sufficiently with the political culture.
3. The composition of the armed forces represents the composition of the political community.²⁶

The existence of citizen-soldiers helps to ensure the military's legitimacy. As both civilians in the community and members of the military structure, citizen-soldiers serve as bridges between national policy and the population, building mutual understanding on national defense and civil defense issues. With respect to national security issues, citizen-soldiers are our society's mechanism for building a

strong relationship between the public and civilian leadership.

Citizen-soldiers, who are leaders in war, are also leaders in peace. Because of their experience and military education, they are, in the eyes of their civilian contacts, national defense experts. Their knowledge tends to form the basis for public opinion on military issues. As part of the local electorate, citizen-soldiers influence elections by sharing personal opinions with other voters in the community.

These soldiers work in the community, go to church there, raise families there, pay taxes there, and are invested in the schools, community affairs, politics, and social conscience. Between work, leisure activities, neighborhood, children's and spouses' activities, and business contacts, citizen-soldiers form hundreds of casual and formal relationships. Those who know them presumably know of their military connection and when a pertinent defense issue arises, their opinions are given special consideration due to their personal knowledge and interest. These soldiers have inordinate influence among friends on those issues.

Citizen-soldiers contribute to society in both roles as citizens and as soldiers. They have the opportunity to give double value or double harm, based on their dual roles in society. In the ideal form, citizen-soldiers take up arms at the behest of country, retain civilian values while serving, bring ingenuity into the military structure, and easily resume civilian pursuits once their tours of duty are over.²⁷

Congress has traditionally played the role of critic of the military and military policy as formed by the executive branch of our government. Generally aware of the attitudes and parochial interests of their constituencies, congressmen are in a natural and constitutional position to act as the watchdog of national military policy. Citizen-soldiers act as significant agents to enlighten both political leadership and fellow citizens of the common concerns of the military and the general population.

The citizen army is a historic unifying bond between a liberal democratic society and a hierarchical military force. "An army tied closely to the whole body of the nation is

most likely to respect nonmilitary national aims, while a citizenry accustomed to military service is best prepared to pass judgment on military issues."²⁸

Active duty soldiers are not usually in a position to provide this bond. As full-time professional soldiers, they have less direct connection to society during their time of service. They work on military installations and often live there as well. Many active duty soldiers shop, attend church, and send their children to schools on their assigned bases. When they vote, they tend to vote on national issues by absentee balloting and have less means than the citizen-soldier of communicating their ideas to their political leadership.

Statistics in September 1994 show that among all of the reserve component forces, 5,439 facilities are spread throughout 4,216 different communities. The total of all members of the Ready Reserve was 1,795,811.²⁹ Based on a 1994 population of 260 million, there is one National Guard or Reserve member for every 145 men, women, and children in the United States. These citizen-soldiers are spread throughout the 50 states, District of Columbia, and US territories and collectively have an influence on American public policy.

Predictably there are occasional tensions between citizen-soldiers' positions in the community and their duties in the military. Pressures from employers over required absences for duty, different values of civilian coworkers, and family pressures of managing two careers play a part in splitting citizen-soldiers' loyalty and commitment. As in other constitutional checks and balances, this reality forces every citizen and the political leadership to evaluate the cost of military involvement in foreign exploits.

Despite these outside pressures, however, the citizen-soldiers' primary function in uniform is to perform military responsibilities when called for either federal or state service. The first objective of the National Guard is to contribute to a professional and competent defense force.

To succeed at war fighting, military men and women must possess distinct values, attitudes, procedures, and organization, but at the same time must represent American society.³⁰ The military ethic is distinct from the norms

of society because of the life and death responsibility that is inherent in the military responsibility. The training soldiers receive helps prepare them to carry out those difficult responsibilities. A tenet of Francis Lieber's Code (General Orders No. 100) taught to Americans in 1863 stated that "men who take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God."³¹ With strong attachments to both civilian and military sectors, citizen-soldiers have better chances of keeping tensions in balance than do full-time soldiers who are daily immersed in the military profession. In fact, there is value gained in both sectors by citizen-soldiers who successfully deal with tensions and bridge the gap.

Scholars from the US Army War College recently assessed that the end of the cold war, in conjunction with the ongoing sociocultural diversification of the United States, may further isolate the military from mainstream American culture and affect civil-military relations.³² As Americans sense an end to any realistic threat to peace in the US, they will feel less of a need for a strong military defense capability. At times like these, the bond between the military and society grows weaker. For Americans to maintain an intellectual connection between political and military leadership, they need to employ every tool to build political-societal understanding.

Likewise, as the size of the active military decreases in response to the reduced global threat, its presence in communities will decrease as well. Active duty facilities are being consolidated, and bases are being closed to reduce overall defense spending. As the active military abandons many locations and consolidates in single, larger populations, many communities are left without any military presence. The National Guard and Reserve forces' armories and training centers are becoming many communities' only connection to military thought.

The National Guard relies on the local and federal political systems to provide adequate training space and facilities. Air National Guard combat units require airspace for flying activities and Army National Guard units need locations to operate their equipment for training. Negotiations

with local authorities for facilities and resources, public relations events, and concerns for environmental impact inform the politicians and communities of the mission and mission requirements of the local units. As communities balance the positive and negative impacts of their local military units, their understanding of defense requirements increases. Likewise, the military leadership's sensitivity to the environmental and social impact of their training on the community grows. As all players negotiate and compromise, the necessity for a military structure reaches a proper balance in the community. This has been identified as "civil-military fusion" and is the desired result in a democratic society.³³

Mechanisms for Society's Understanding of Military Policy and Activity

Reflecting again on the original intent of the citizen-soldier army, the National Guard's mission is to provide a national and state defense force made up of members of the general population. This section discusses how citizen-soldiers fulfill their dual roles and how they serve as bridges between the military and society as well as between society and national security policy.

In American democracy, any mechanism which builds mutual understanding between the military and society helps ensure that military policy and military activities remain properly focused for the public good. The following paragraphs highlight mechanisms unique to the National Guard which serve that purpose.

Employer Support

Business employers suffer one of the greatest liabilities of the Reserve Component Policy. Despite the benefits that military experience brings to a guardsman's full-time job, an employer must accommodate absences for training and active duty. Coworkers must take up the slack when a guardsman is absent, and often the employer is not able to hire a competent replacement to cover even extended absences because of special skills requirements. Federal law offers the individual guardsman seniority protection, job

security, and reemployment rights after required military training and activation. For this reason, the employer must hold a vacancy for the guardsman's return from active duty and in many cases continue to maintain the cost of personal benefits during periods of absence. No one has a greater investment in the National Guard program than the employer, especially in small businesses.

Consequently, to build strong understanding and support, programs have been established to inform the employers of the need of military deployments and training. A Department of Defense (DOD) Special Task Force Report on Quality of Life stated that "employer support for the Reserve component is key to long term stability and effective employment of the Total Force concept."³⁴ In 1972 the DOD created the National Committee for Employer Support of the National Guard and Reserve.³⁵ Now there are 53 state-level committees that maintain relationships with major employers and reach other employers through Kiwanis, Rotary, and other fraternal organizations. Employer support of the Reserve forces is critical if the Reserves are to maintain a high-caliber membership. Importantly, employer support programs are active within National Guard organizations and are readily supported by local commanders.

In their own self-interest, business leaders have strong political connections for a variety of reasons. Since one of their interests is their employees' military commitments, their connection to the political process gives employer support programs a natural political impact. Business leaders, with their strong voice in political affairs, help to ensure that their employees' involvement in military training and deployments is legitimate and worthwhile. These programs, therefore, have value in influencing responsible national security policy.

Community Outreach: Building a Human Bridge

Community outreach programs raise public awareness of the military and serve to build positive civilian-military links. These are elective programs that are beyond the requirements of the Guard mission but which contribute to both the community and the skills of the guardsmen. For

example, Army Guard medics throughout the country have set up clinics in underprivileged neighborhoods to perform critically needed diagnostic and clinical care such as dental and visual checkups.

The militia is also useful in helping police maintain order in large public events. One visible example was the Pope's visit to Denver when over a million youth gathered for a parade and overnight outdoor worship service. The Guard's medical, transportation, and manpower contributions were critical to maintaining a safe and orderly event. The event received national media coverage with positive publicity for the National Guard.

Reserve Education

A number of government-funded education programs for National Guard and Reserve officers and enlisted people are effective in tying military and civil communities together in local colleges and universities around the country. After World War I, military leadership hoped for improved civil-military relations and emphasized training and education of the civilian components of the military. The Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) emerged making military education available in many colleges and some high schools. ROTC intended to build public support and take advantage of local pride.³⁶

Charles Moskos, a military sociologist, in *Public Opinion and the Military Establishment*, states, "The continued presence in substantial numbers in the armed forces of officers from a wide variety of civilian educational backgrounds and institutions is one of the best guarantees against the establishment in this country of a military caste or clique."³⁷ ROTC remains as the primary education avenue of the officer corps in the armed forces including the National Guard and Reserve.

The National Guard sponsors an education benefit program as a recruitment tool for their enlisted membership. This program is popular and gives many guardsmen an opportunity to complete higher education in local colleges and universities.

National Guard and active duty military members who return to the community bring their values and such skills

as fire fighting, electronics, and medical expertise, along with training in leadership, discipline, loyalty, courage, selfless service, and responsibility that they learned in the service. Gen James McCarthy, former deputy commander of the US European Command, stated that "the military, then, is a key reservoir of the larger moral, spiritual and social values upon which our nation was founded."³⁸ That facet of military service offers immeasurable added value to the national moral fiber and skill level of the community.

State Role of the National Guard

The National Guard as the state militia provides a powerful armed force to cope with civil disturbance and disorder as well as providing manpower to deal with natural disasters. National Guard membership comes from the community, is a reflection of the community, and has a stake in the outcome of any local disaster. At the discretion of the governor of the state, the National Guard is available for any domestic requirement within state boundaries.

During local crises, the National Guard can be critical in meeting the immediate needs of the community. Many people see their National Guard in action only during times when the Guard is activated for state emergencies. At those times, the community sees the value of the Guard, and the training guardsmen have received pays significant dividends for the people they defend. The blending of militia and active forces for national defense purposes and the availability of the militia for domestic purposes is a success of American democracy.

Provides Military Knowledge to Congressmen

A generation ago, three-quarters of the members of Congress were veterans. Today, only a third of the House members have served in the military.³⁹ Many of those served short enlisted tours and had a limited or negative experience. In many cases, the National Guard unit in their district is the only exposure that congressmen have with the military.

The National Guard adjutant general facilitates congressmen's exposure to the military. The adjutant general,

who in most states is a political appointee of the governor, maintains close ties with the state legislature and the federal congressional contingent. A large part of the adjutant general's responsibility is to gain support from the state and federal legislatures for facilities, training airspace, maneuver areas, and mission training opportunities. The adjutant general's influence with the state legislature and US congressional contingent is by necessity well developed in most states. His influence, along with that of other prominent guardsmen, is effective in educating the state's political leadership of the activities and needs of the National Guard organization.

**Flexible National Policy:
Contingency Operations Worldwide**

In this era, since the end of international bipolarism, the US has become increasingly involved worldwide in low-level contingency operations. Sometimes labeled operations other than war, these events demand multiple and sometimes long-term commitments from the US military. Because of the variety of skills in the National Guard and Reserve forces, especially among the combat support and combat service support units, the reserve component will be very useful in fulfilling future military commitments.

Reserve forces provide the national command authorities flexible options in responding to international emergencies. Reserve component units are well suited to taking their turns in staffing military commitments on a pre-planned basis. Recent changes to the federal law provide the president great flexibility in activating the Reserves on either a voluntary or involuntary basis for as much as 270 days without declaring a national emergency, as long as he gives 24-hour notice of his intentions to the Congress. This authority gives the president the opportunity to send a clear message to any potential adversary that the US is serious about its position on an issue. Calling on the National Guard and Reserves gives clear notice that the nation is willing to make the necessary commitment to ensure its national security. Activations for the *Pueblo* crisis, Cuban missile crisis, and Berlin crisis are good examples

of the effectiveness of this political tool available to the president.

Influence of the National Guard on National Security Policy

By constitutional authority and legislative action, the national command authorities of the United States can exercise a wide variety of reactions to threats on national security. The reaction may or may not involve the military, but when the situation calls for a military response, the use of the National Guard raises the level of significance of the response. In calling the National Guard, the president demonstrates a greater commitment to the cause and ensures the involvement of a large sector of the national population. Political, military, and economic risks play heavily in the authorities' decisions.

The Vietnam War was fought almost exclusively by professional active duty forces. A robust draft augmented those forces with conscripts, most of whom could not avoid it.

A combination of professional active duty military plus the National Guard and Reserve fought the Persian Gulf War. These members were part of the all-volunteer total force.

The Persian Gulf War illustrated a positive relationship between national security policy and the will of the people with amicable civil-military relations. The Vietnam War illustrated just the opposite.

The US is at the point today where National Guard and Reserve involvement is necessary for even small mobilizations. This total force concept has evolved through painful historical experience and significant changes in national security policy. The next section focuses on mobilization or nonmobilization of the National Guard and Reserve forces as a key determinant in building and maintaining "civil-military fusion," the responsible use of the military in acting for the national defense.

Vietnam: Weak Civil-Military Relations with Nonmobilization

The Prussian philosopher Carl von Clausewitz wrote, "War cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever

this occurs in our thinking about war, the main links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense."⁴⁰ Clausewitz could have used the US war in Vietnam as his case in point. One of the great tragedies of the Vietnam War is that it was fought, at least in its later stages, despite the opposition of the US population. The fact that President Lyndon Baines Johnson did not seek reelection in the midst of the war is testimony to his failure to maintain the support of the electorate in the war.

In 1965, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) recommended a call-up of 235,000 members of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. The proposal for a reserve activation was motivated partly by military concerns, but also by political considerations. JCS Chairman Gen Earle G. Wheeler stated, "We felt it would be desirable to have a reserve call-up in order to make sure that the people of the United States knew that we were in a war and not engaged at some two-penny military adventure."⁴¹

President Johnson overruled his defense secretary's recommendation and announced that monthly draft calls would be raised from 17,000 to 35,000. He said that "it was not essential to order Reserve units into service now."⁴² He astounded the defense establishment by his refusal to call up the Reserves to support expansion of the war, perhaps the most fateful decision of the entire conflict. Johnson's refusal was apparently motivated in part by reluctance to spread the effects of the war throughout the population. Certainly, many more families, along with virtually every town and city in the US, would have been affected by a call-up of any proportion. A much different class cross section and a much greater political impact would have resulted had he used the Reserve forces and not depended on draftees, a force comprised mostly of those who could not engineer a deferment. His decision was an attempt to prosecute the war on a low-key basis. He wanted to fight a war without admitting he was fighting a war.⁴³

Had he called the reserve components, the men and women fighting the war would have cut across the economic,

political, and social strata in most American communities. That could have served as a litmus test of the political will. President Johnson consciously avoided that test, to the long-term detriment of America's commitment to the war.⁴⁴ Mobilization would have sparked national debate on the whole issue of support for the war.⁴⁵

Brig Gen Michael W. Davidson, adjutant general of the Kentucky National Guard, described calling up the National Guard and Reserve as a political sound barrier, one that Johnson was not willing to break.⁴⁶ It was the biggest mistake of his presidency. That was an issue which should have been squarely confronted, not sidestepped.

General Davidson goes on to say that "if American national security policy making is soundly developed and broadly based, there will not be a political sound barrier to overcome in calling up the National Guard and Reserve forces."⁴⁷ President Johnson's attempt to limit the war to draftees in order not to involve the national consciousness was a violation of trust with the nation.

The *Pueblo* crisis in 1968 forced President Johnson to, in part, alter his policy. To immediately make forces available and send North Korea a strong message, a number of National Guard and Reserve units were recalled to active duty—20,034 National Guard and Reserve soldiers were recalled with approximately 50 percent eventually serving in Vietnam.⁴⁸ The reason they served in Vietnam was because of the influence of the military leadership, not due to any change in policy from the Office of the President. Nonetheless, it was a minuscule fraction of the two and one-half million soldiers who served in Vietnam. The politics of mobilizing the reserve component forces was complex and controversial. It is probably not coincidental that Johnson announced even the small muster of National Guard and Reserve forces for Vietnam in the same speech in which he withdrew from consideration for reelection.⁴⁹

Except for the professional active duty personnel, the wrong people fought the war. They were not a cross section of all of America. As draftees, they were nonvolunteers, and consistently were from lower income families. They were, by and large, the nonpolitically connected and those who

did not choose to go to college or get married to earn a deferment.

A telling 1970 statistic is that only 8 percent of the sons of senators and congressmen who had come of age since the US became involved in Vietnam ever saw combat. No one on the House Armed Services Committee had a son or grandson who saw duty in Vietnam. Only one, Maryland Congressman Clarence Long's son, was wounded.⁵⁰ If the national leadership had little personal stake, they had little motivation to ensure responsible national policy.

Those who were more fortunate or politically connected figured out that the National Guard and Reserve forces would not be mobilized. Those organizations then became a haven for those who were willing to accept a six-year reserve commitment in lieu of the draft. Former Vice President Dan Quayle was not an anomaly. He was a politically connected individual who took a legal, some would say rational, but certainly not an active role in the military. Many like him did the same. In the late 1960s, National Guard personnel were overwhelmingly white, male, and middle class. They were lambasted as a bastion of established privilege that systematically excluded minorities.⁵¹

The National Guard and Reserve units paid the price. Their legitimacy was undercut. Their professional membership was devastated not only by their inability to participate as they had been trained but by the reputation they were gaining as a result of the nonmobilization policy. Morale was at an all-time low. According to the official history, the Army Reserve's ability to go to war was near zero.⁵²

Collectively, the nonmobilization policy, the unequal draft policy, the lack of domestic support, and the extended years of the war devastated the entire military and its credibility. Both the regular forces and the Reserves suffered from the decision not to utilize reserve component forces. There were five results of these dysfunctional policies.

1. Rather than go for multiple tours, many experienced veterans left the service.
2. The Army suffered problems of nonprofessionalism, drug use, and racial strife.⁵³

3. Conscientious reservist leadership became frustrated with the recruits who had motivations that were antimilitary.

4. Upgrades in equipment were withheld from the National Guard, further harming professional morale.

5. Leadership in combat was mostly young and inexperienced while the nation declined to tap the experience base in the National Guard.

The nation suffered because it was getting no value for the money it had spent on the National Guard and Reserve forces. Many Americans were incensed that their sons and husbands were being drafted to risk death in Southeast Asia while men who had received drill pay for years stayed at home.⁵⁴

American communities collectively had no stake in the war because their local National Guard units remained at home. Individual families suffered, but there was no organized outcry from the grass roots. The general US population had no motivation to ensure that the sacrifices of those who did serve were in some way validated by the eventual outcome.⁵⁵

The lessons of Vietnam led directly to a change in reserve policy. President Johnson's nonmobilization "skeleton in the closet" had a large impact on the forthcoming total force policy.⁵⁶ This new policy would have the opportunity to prove itself in the Persian Gulf mobilization.

The Total Force Policy

The total force was born from Nixon administration policy, conceived in 1970 and formally adopted as national security policy in 1973. The concept grew not only out of the US experience in the Vietnam War, but with the end of the draft and the decline in defense budgets.⁵⁷

A common description of the armed forces at the end of the Vietnam War was the "hollow force."⁵⁸ Not only was the military's reputation poor in the eyes of the public, but real capability also rapidly deteriorated for a number of reasons. The quality of recruitment was affected negatively when conscription ended because educated persons were no longer motivated by the draft to voluntarily join the

service and branch of their choice. Major force reductions drove many experienced personnel out of the military. Motivation in the National Guard and Reserve forces was poor because of carry-over problems from their nonmobilization. Except for the few units that mobilized, Reserve forces themselves lacked confidence in their legitimacy. The system was sick, and the US military needed a total makeover of its force structure.

That makeover came in the form of total force policy and its concomitant policy for the all-volunteer force. Defense reports in 1970 and 1971 during system analysis had language like "Defense planning will now emphasize . . . the need to plan for optimum use of all military and related resources available to meet the requirements of Free World security," and "These Free World military and related resources—which we call 'Total Force'—include both Active and Reserve components of the US."⁵⁹

Total force policy, which relies on the reserve components, rests on three pillars. The first is cost. In the post-war reductions, a larger total force could be realized because of the lower peacetime sustaining costs of National Guard organizations compared to similar active organizations. Direct unit comparisons by the DOD indicate the National Guard military units cost between 25 and 40 percent less to operate than regular military units.⁶⁰

The second is the experience level of the Guard and Reserve forces, which is higher on average than active duty units because of the stability of the units and the recent experience of members from active duty service. For instance, in the Air National Guard (ANG), approximately 70 percent of the pilots have previous experience in the active components. Additionally, ANG pilots fly their entire careers and are not generally required to stand down at any period in their career for staff assignments. That means that the average experience level in the ANG cockpits is eight to 10 years greater than the active component.

The third is the tradition of the citizen-soldier and his close ties to the community.⁶¹

The designers of the total force policy felt that the fundamental shortfall in Vietnam was a lack of understanding and support for the war among the American people. They

recognized that to gain that support they would have to ensure the involvement of community-level support. In his article "Vietnam Baggage," Gen Michael Davidson wrote, "A Total Force structure, melding the Active and Reserve component forces would have the effect of making it very difficult, if not impossible, for America to go to war again without the broad support implicit in a major National Guard and Reserve call-up."⁶²

The primary leaders of the total force concept were Gen Creighton Abrams, Army chief of staff late in the Vietnam War, and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. The lessons of Vietnam led General Abrams to conclude that the credibility of the military depended on the will of the American people and the commitment to deploy the citizen-soldiers as an integral part of that force.⁶³ He noted that it was only with this commitment from the grass roots that American opinion and support could be solidified. He felt that the only way to regain credibility of the US defense establishment was to involve the citizen-soldier in the total force.⁶⁴ General Abrams' goal was to intertwine the active and reserve components so completely that to fight any war, a president would have to obtain congressional support and, in turn, as Carl von Clausewitz states, "the will of the people."⁶⁵ Abrams was quoted as saying, "If we're ever going to war again, we're going to take the Reserves with us."⁶⁶

The total force would implement an all-volunteer concept, reduce the size of the active duty forces, and strengthen the reserve component. In this manner, Secretary Melvin Laird intended to rebuild public confidence in the military. This trend back toward the citizen-soldier notion in American armed forces was a traditional one closely tied to American political values and the nature of our democratic system.⁶⁷

The total force served the purpose of giving the reserve components back their legitimacy and confidence. Referencing total force policy, Secretary Laird stated, "Members of the National Guard and Reserve, instead of draftees, will be the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any further emergency requiring rapid and substantial expansion of active forces."⁶⁸ Laird's successor as secretary of defense, James Schlesinger, stated, "The

basic concept of the Total Force has in itself provided a new sense of purpose. Guardsmen and Reservists now see growing evidence that they will be called and have a role to play in future emergencies."⁶⁹

**The Persian Gulf War:
Civil-Military Relations with Mobilization**

The first large-scale implementation of total force policy came in 1990 with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Persian Gulf War. The Army called up more reservists than the other services. They activated 1,033 reserve units—just short of 150,000 personnel—and deployed 69 percent of them (708 units) to the Persian Gulf. These reserve units represented all facets of the Army: combat, combat support, and combat service support. They served in field artillery, military police, maintenance, medical, engineer, and petroleum as well as several other types of units. At one point, 25 percent of all Army personnel serving in Southwest Asia were members of the reserve component.⁷⁰

The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve also made a significant contribution to the Persian Gulf War. The primary contributors by unit specialty were strategic and tactical airlift, air refueling, tactical reconnaissance, aerial post, combat communications, medical and aeromedical evacuation, and tactical fighters. Virtually all Reserve airlift personnel became involved in the air mobility effort. Twelve of 13 ANG KC-135 tanker units were activated and five ANG and Reserve fighter squadrons were mobilized. According to the National Guard Bureau, 10,456 air guardsmen were mobilized for active duty during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.⁷¹ Of the total Air Force personnel in theater by the end of the war, 12,000 of the 55,000 (22 percent) were members of the Air Reserve Component.⁷²

Gen Colin Powell, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on 3 December 1990, commented, "The success of the Guard and Reserve participation cannot be overemphasized. Their participation has been a significant factor in affording us flexibility and balance." He commented at the end of the war that the contributions of

the reservists were "magnificent . . . one of the major success stories of the entire operation."⁷³

The contribution of the citizen-soldier in the Persian Gulf goes well beyond numbers and combat participation. Since a large reserve mobilization requires congressional notification and ultimate approval, the president can no longer deploy significant forces for combat without congressional approval. The total force policy guarantees that without broad and deep support for US military action abroad, the deployment of Reserve forces from as many as 4,200 separate communities in the US would become an impossibility. Without the Reserve component forces, the US simply cannot go to war.⁷⁴

It is for this reason that total force policy, and therefore the citizen-soldier, ensures that politicians have to gauge the national will prior to committing US forces, since to fight a war other than a very small contingency requires mobilization of the reserve components.

The symbolic yellow ribbons tied on trees across America in commemoration of every home-town soldier who was deployed were powerful symbols of community support for the war. The communities had a motivation to ensure that the sacrifices of those who served were in some way validated by the outcome. The political leadership, which is responsible to its constituency, has not only the political pressure, but the responsibility therefore to share in the communities' concern for validation. Collectively, every constituency exerted significant influence on their congressional delegations.

Participation of the Reserve forces in the Persian Gulf War forced the political leadership to consider the desires of the population before committing troops and to have an interest in ensuring the outcome was commensurate with the manpower commitment in numbers and lives. This direct connection between civil leadership and the military is what the democracy of the United States is all about.

The testimony to the success of the use of the citizen-soldier in the war and the implementation of total force policy was the overwhelming public support for the war, the president, the military, and the congressmen who backed it.

Readiness, Availability, and Capability: National Guard Necessities

Despite the unique value of the National Guard and Reserve forces and their role in promoting "civil-military fusion," the total force must not compromise in its ability to act as a credible and potent fighting force in times of national emergency. There has certainly been no lack of criticism of the militia, volunteers, and National Guard throughout history. In fact, documentation is clear that there are 388 years of criticism since the first colonial militias were formed. A positive national consensus on the National Guard has been achieved only in the last five years, since the success of Operation Desert Storm proved the viability of the total force policy.

Criticism has traditionally been on lack of readiness, poor officer leadership, and lack of availability on short notice. The criticism has been offset, however, by complaints from the Reserve forces that they have been underfunded and not allowed to train in first-line equipment, denying their usefulness for rapid deployment. Much of both the criticism and the responses have been valid, leaving the controversy wide open to biased interpretation.

It is in the interest of the nation for national defense policy to allow all National Guard and Reserve forces to be properly trained, be led by competent commanders, and be equipped with first-line equipment. If we fail in this policy, we will find in the future good reason to rely on the active duty forces alone to implement military force and deny the nation the benefits of the total force.

An organization with primary interest in ensuring that the National Guard is viable and a significant player in the total force is the National Guard Association of the US (NGAUS). Its purpose is to make certain that the National Guard is properly equipped and structured to be able to fight alongside the active duty forces in times of national emergency. NGAUS exercises its influence with the Congress and the president for this purpose.

NGAUS is similar to the Reserve Officers Association, the Air Force Association, and dozens of other military political action groups that have the interests of their specific service or component in mind. NGAUS gets particularly

large attention because of its political strength. Its power comes from its ability to tie the needs of the National Guard for readiness to specific units in the constituencies of congressional legislators.

The next section illustrates the significance of the influence of NGAUS through a historical example. Whether the influence is proper or not is controversial and beyond the scope of this paper. The fact is, however, that the political influence of NGAUS is reality that must be addressed because it has been and remains a significant power of the National Guard in shaping national security policy.

National Guard Influence on National Security Policy

Even as World War II was raging, Gen George C. Marshall, Army chief of staff, realized that postwar pressures would require dismantling the military. He called on Brig Gen John McAuley Palmer to help "develop a post-war military system that would be consistent with our traditions, and one which might therefore expect favorable consideration by the American people and Congress."⁷⁵

General Palmer had been described by General Marshall as the "civilian conscience of the US Army."⁷⁶ He felt that the citizen-soldier was valuable if given proper professional training and was isolated from the state politics surrounding the National Guard. He advocated universal military training which would substitute a massive citizen reserve force for a large peacetime professional Army and would minimize the cost of national defense. Organization and training would be a federal responsibility. The National Guard with its divided state and federal loyalties would be dissolved as a federal reserve force.

The postwar transition of the military force structure was influenced by several factors: the need to reduce the size of the active duty military, the need to maintain a sufficient force that could fulfill new worldwide commitments, the abundance of excess wartime armor and aircraft, and the competing military and political factions that had a stake in the postwar military structure.

Significant political haggling ensued. Pressure to maintain an active duty force existed because of the perception

that National Guard mobilization, reorganization, and training performance had been poor. The National Guard public relations had failed them. Guard leadership felt that they were scapegoats for inadequacies in prewar Army plans, organization, facilities, and equipment.

Through their powerful lobby, NGAUS, National Guard officers subsequently became politically active. The NGAUS president, Maj Gen Ellard A. Walsh, who was also the president of the Adjutant Generals Association, set up his Washington headquarters to defend the National Guard's interests against the Regular Army. American domestic politics were employed in the interservice struggle in the late and postwar period.

The Guard, represented by its chief political organ, NGAUS, is one of the most effective pressure groups in American politics. There are five primary reasons for this.

1. The National Guard is a public institution sanctioned by the Constitution's military clause.
2. The National Guard is a nationwide institution with units deeply rooted in communities in nearly every congressional district.
3. The National Guard profits from its close connections with state governments and political party organizations. The National Guard within the state is administered by an adjutant general who is usually a political appointee of the governor.
4. NGAUS is a tightly disciplined organization with clear and readily communicated basic goals.
5. Nearly 100 percent of the commissioned cadre are NGAUS members.⁷⁷

NGAUS used grassroots contacts between individual guardsmen and congressmen in their districts. The goal was to gain attention and to alert congressmen on the Guard's position on issues. Carefully cultivated friendships often facilitated the Guard's appeals to Congress. Its independence of the War Department and expertise in reserve matters were highly valued by Congress.⁷⁸

General Walsh was determined that the Guard survive as the nation's first-line combat reserve force after World War II. NGAUS insisted that it be guaranteed participation

in the postwar planning process, maintain its position as the Army's first-line civilian reserve component, and retain its dual state-federal status.⁷⁹ As a result of the Guard's influence, General Palmer reversed his position and sided with the National Guard.

A compromise was reached. The National Guard accepted universal training to ensure its position as the primary Army reserve component, and this was accepted by Palmer and Marshall.⁸⁰ The consensus was acrimoniously obtained, but Marshall, who wanted action before wartime enthusiasm waned, accepted the compromise and used National Guard influence for this joint agenda. At the same time, under Gen Henry H. Arnold, the Army Air Forces (AAF) studied the prospect for postwar National Guard air units. The study recommended that separate National Guard air component units be established as the first line of reserve air forces.

Air staff officers had reservations about putting high-technology aircraft in the Guard's air component and were well aware of the difficulty in identifying a state-related air mission. They also realized the wisdom of any plan that would increase public support for the AAF as a separate service. They, therefore, put their support behind an Air National Guard that would share with the Army National Guard a dual state-federal status.⁸¹

General Marshall, determined to win NGAUS support for his postwar plans and to stretch austere postwar military budgets as far as possible, directed the AAF to create the Air Guard as a part of a dual-component air reserve system. The AAF bowed to Marshall's pressure, thereby minimizing its political problems and achieving its long-cherished goal of independence from the Army.⁸²

The aggressive fight between AAF interest in a separate Air Force, the Army command interest in maintaining a strong postwar military, and the National Guard insistence on establishing itself as the dominant reserve force, both Army and Air, resulted in a compromise that met everyone's objectives. This compromise demonstrates that the National Guard Bureau and NGAUS, powerful representatives of the citizen-soldier, had a large part in

establishing postwar force structure and national security policy.

Conclusion

A DOD special task force stated,

Because of the shrinking military population, fewer people have direct contact with military service members. The significant decline in military experience of the American public and legislative members poses the risk of having an all-volunteer force isolated from the general population, or worse, alienated. Historically, the reserve component has played a significant role in assuring a better understanding of the need for military forces and developing support for military members within the states and communities.⁸³

This finding of the task force capsulizes perfectly the need to maintain a high percentage of the US military force in the Guard and Reserve.

The reliance on the Guard follows a long-term tradition in the United States for the use of an individual who is both citizen and soldier with loyalties and close associations with both roles. Tradition and the Constitution serve to guard the individual rights of Americans, and the citizen-soldier fulfills that protection. He has both direct and indirect influences on his elected officials, which gives him and his community a stake and position in policy decision making.

Former Secretary Laird said recently in evaluating the success of total force policy, "It has been the personal commitment of every citizen-soldier that has turned the Total Force concept into what it has become today, the foundation of America's security posture."⁸⁴

The role of the Guard and Reserve forces in two twentieth-century wars demonstrates their value in ensuring the public trust when US forces are used abroad. The result of the absence of the reserve component in the Vietnam War and its necessity in the Persian Gulf War is a clear message for the future.

Secretary of Defense William J. Perry said recently, "In the future, Reservists will play a larger role and America must remember the actual and potential sacrifices Reservists make to serve the nation. The American people must be ready to support [these] Reservists, their families, and

their employers in the greater role they will play in America's defense."⁸⁵

We should not underestimate the impact of the yellow ribbons on every tree on every main street in America. With a strong National Guard and its membership of citizen-soldiers, national security policy will remain consistent with the will of the people—the ultimate requirement of our democracy.

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